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1 Introduction: Why licensing agreements encourage competition 
 
 At first glance, the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPR) and 
competition may seem like a particularly uneasy one. After all, anyone can start selling 
lemonade, but a certain widget1 that is patented by a company will confer a de facto, 
completely legal exclusive monopoly for 20 years to come. Still, economists and 
competition authorities claim that patents encourage innovation and competition, and 
bring benefits and lower prices to the consumers. How can this be true? 
 Firstly, the mere existence of a legal method to protect inventions from illegal 
copying is believed to be an incentive to spend time and money on research and 
development. A new drug, for instance, may cost millions of euros and years of research 
may be spent before it is even introduced on the market. Then it is only fair that the 
company who made it can exploit it for some years, and if their competitors would like 
a share of the pie, they would have to make a better drug themselves. This way, 
companies in the same product market must constantly compete fiercely to be able to 
hold the rights to the state-of-the-art-product, which will give the consumers the most 
novel products at the best price. For instance, the patent of a certain way of cleaning 
music cassettes may still be valid, but not worth a eurocent anymore, since new 
technology has taken over the product market. Had there not been a legal certainty in 
patens, companies would probably never have taken on the expensive task of inventing 
the CD. 
 Secondly, there have been allegations that patents create lazy monopolists who 
simply lean back and enjoy the turnaround. This was the topic of an article in The 
Economist recently2, where is was pointed out that many of the most innovative 
companies of today have market shares that constitutes a monopoly, which can be seen 
as a paradox. Some economists claim that wealth in itself, and not necessarily a 
monopolist position, gives an opportunity and muscles to innovate, constantly keeping 
competitors at arm's length. At the same time, big companies have "the blessing of 
                                                 
1 An common term describing an imaginary product. Often used when explaining economic theories. 
2 The Economist Online, published 22 May 2004. www.economist.com 
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scale" and often better market knowledge, with the ability to read the market in a better 
way than the smaller, less fortunate widget-producers. This way, they can conduct 
expensive market surveys, and get to know what the consumers ask for.  
 In the end, the task for competition authorities will be to balance competition 
and patents in a way that ensures the legal certainty of a time-limited monopoly in 
producing the product, at the same time as they will have to intervene if the product is 
being sold at unreasonable prices. As Mario Monti, the Commissioner for Competition 
Policy, pointed out in a speech on the new block exemption for technology transfer 
agreements recently: The task will be to "marry the innovation bride and the 
competition groom"3. Whether or not this task has been fulfilled successfully by the 
Commission, and especially how the rules are constructed in the new block exemption 
on technology transfer agreements, will be among the core topics of this paper. 
2 Modus operandi 
 
2.1 The aim of this paper 
 In this paper, I will seek to explain the most important rules that emerged with 
the brand new Regulation No 772/2004; the new block exemption for technology 
transfer agreements (from now on dubbed TTBE). Doing so, it will be important to bear 
in mind the new set of rules in Regulation No 1/2003, the so-called modernisation 
regulation, that also was brought into force throughout the Community from May 1st. 
2004. The latter regulation changes the enforcement of art. 81 and 82 EC4, and 
influences the way EC competition policy is to be treated by the companies themselves, 
especially in terms of exemptions and art. 81(3). At the same time, I will grant some 
limited space to explain the nature of a EU-regulation and a block exemption in general.  
 In discussing the new TTBE, focus will be on the shift from the black-, white-, 
and grey-lists to the new regime implementing market share caps and banned hardcore 
                                                 
3 Speech/04/19, Mario Monti, speech at Ecole des Mines, Paris, 16th. January 2004. 
4 All references to the EC Treaty in this paper have numbering introduced by the amended Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
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restraints. I will also focus on the methods used to define the relevant market for the 
purpose of technology transfer agreements, where both the geographic market, the 
product market and the technology market need to be defined. Further, the difference 
between licensing agreements between competitors and non-competitors will be 
illustrated. 
 Certain bordering areas of technology transfer agreements will not be debated in 
this paper: Whether an agreements between an EU-based company and a firm from 
outside the Union can be subject to EC competition law will not be brought up, nor will 
detailed IPR-law in general, the drafting of the new European patent directive or certain 
EEA-spesific questions. Finally, the excluded restrictions in art. 5 of the TTBE will not 
be dealt with in detail. 
 
 
2.2 Method used and sources of law 
 The most important source of law in EC legislation is the Treaty itself. In terms 
of competition law, art. 81 and 82 are the standout provisions which both deal solely 
with competition matters. But there are several other articles that can apply in different 
circumstances, for instance the rules of the four freedoms. 
 The second most important set of rules are Regulations. According to art. 249 
EC, these have been given general application, and will thus be "binding in its entirety 
and directly applicable in all Member States"5. This is in contrast to directives, which as 
a general rule6 must be incorporated into national legislation before they can be applied 
directly and granted direct effect.7  
 In addition, EU-law recognises in art. 249 EC decisions as binding to whom they 
are addressed, while recommendations and opinions are sources of law that have no 
binding force. In addition, both the ECJ and the CFI8 do in fact in a number of cases get 
inspiration from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 
Strasbourg, even though this rarely happens on the field of competition. The community 
                                                 
5 Art. 249 EC para 2. 
6 As stated in Dori (Case C-91/92). See in contrast CIA (Case No 194/94). 
7 According to art. 249 EC para 3, directives "shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods". 
8 European Court of Justice and Court of First Instance. 
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courts also have the final word in disputes concerning the interpretation of EU-
legislation. 
 Apart from the TTBE itself, the Guidelines to the TTBE were published by the 
Commission parallel with the Regulation. Surely, the Guidelines are of high relevance, 
as they explain not only the background and the need for a new legal approach, but also 
set out examples and show how the legality of agreements which no not fall in under the 
new Regulation are to be examined. However, being a Commission Notice, the 
Guidelines are not legally binding. This is also true for other Commission Notices used 
in this paper. 
 The body of case-law used in this paper is mainly from the Community courts, 
although other cases may be used to illustrate examples. Because of the need of uniform 
interpretation, national court decisions will seldom be of a high relevance in EC law. 
 Writings, books and commentaries from judicial experts will be used in this 
paper, although these have not been given any formal weight in the treaty. Since TTBE 
was neither finished nor in force before the end of April and May 1st. 20049, literature 
on this field is rather fragmentary. Therefore, where documents published on-line are 
used as references, I will use the internet address (URL) in the reference field, and state 
the date the document was found. 
3 Art. 81 and modernisation: The new regime in EC competition policy 
 
3.1 Background 
 Throughout the decades of enforcement of EC competition rules, the 
Commission adopted a specific way of granting exceptions from the prohibition rules in 
the competition provisions. Judging from art. 81(1), a vast majority of cooperation 
agreements made both between competitors and non-competitors would be deemed 
illegal, and thus also void after art. 81(2). And although the Commission and the ECJ 
indeed developed a rather strict interpretation of the prohibition, the reality was 
                                                 
9 The final Regulation is marked "done at Brussels, 27 April 2004", only few days before it was due to be 
in force. 
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somewhat different; many agreements were not harmful to competition, either because 
these were made between companies with a minimal market share, or the agreements 
simply did not have the effect of distorting competition.  
 The Commission have for many years had the possibility of giving so-called 
individual exemptions after art. 81(3), based on the general legal idea that a general rule 
cannot be applied when the considerations behind that very same rule does not 
materialise themselves in a particular case. The main problem with exemptions to the 
EC competition rules, however, was the fact that the Commission was given a 
monopoly of grating the exemptions after Regulation 17/62. The idea was that 
companies who believed they where about to enter an agreement possibly infringing art. 
81(1), could apply for an exemption, and then get one within a reasonable time-frame, if 
the Commission found no hardcore restrictions or other real threats to competition 
inherent in the agreement. 
 This approach of gathering of all powers in the hands of the Commission proved 
to be somewhat of a failure. An insecure competition environment emerged, where 
companies in the then 15 member states received a so-called "letter of comfort" from 
the Commission upon applying for an exemption after art. 81(3). This document was 
barely a presumption that the agreement in question probably was not contrary to art. 
81(1) (thus satisfying the criteria in art. 81(3)), and had no legal value in itself. In 
theory, a company could receive a letter of comfort, only to receive a lawsuit lodged 
before the ECJ by the very same Commission a couple of years later. At the same time, 
the Commission's workload was enormous, and the applications for exemptions piled up 
in Brussels. 
 Come the 1990s, when debate arose on these matters. In 1999, the Commission 
published a White Paper on Modernisation10, where it provides a rather simple solution 
to the pile-up problem; an end to the Commission's exclusive right of granting 
exemptions to art. 81(1), and an abolition of the whole notification procedure. From 
now on, the question of determining whether the agreement was anti-competitive or not, 
shifted to the companies themselves. These are the basics of Regulation 1/2003, which 
will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
                                                 
10 OJ [1999] C 132/1. 
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3.2 Art. 81 (1) EC 
 Being the most important provision in the field of competition for companies not 
having a dominant position in the market, art. 81 has a fairly extensive text, filled with 
terms that must be interpreted. The structure of the article is simple; the prohibition 
itself is placed in the first paragraph, the somewhat misplaced statement of voidness in 
paragraph two, and finally the exemptions in paragraph three.  
 Over the following pages, I will as briefly as possible elaborate the prohibition 
in art. 81(1). Due to the limited space available in this paper, this is not intended to be a 
thorough analysis of the enormous body of case-law on this field and different types of 
agreements caught, though it will have to be mentioned as a background for 
understanding the exemptions later. The focal point; the block exemption for 
technology transfer agreements, will be elaborated in detail from chapter 4, together 
with questions concerning market definitions and the different forms of so-called 
hardcore restrictions mentioned in art. 8 (1)(a)-(e) which are relevant on the field of 
technology transfer agreements. 
 
 Art. 81(1) EC reads: 
 "1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: 
 all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
 and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and 
 which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
 competition within the common market, and in particular those which: 
 
 (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
 conditions; 
 
 (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
 
 (c) share markets or sources of supply; 
 
 (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
 parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
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 (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
 supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
 usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
  
  
 Judging from the wording of art. 81(1) first paragraph, three different forms of 
cooperation are caught; standard agreements between undertakings, decisions of an 
association of undertakings and concerted practices. 
 First of all, the term "undertaking" must be interpreted, as it is not defined in the 
Treaty itself. According to the jurisprudence of the ECJ, the mere legal status of an 
undertaking is not important; it is whether or not the entity is engaged in economic 
activities that is material. In Höfner, this is expressed by the Court as "the concept of an 
undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of the 
legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed"11. This includes many 
bodies partly or wholly owned, funded or financed by public authorities, different 
"clubs" and even FIFA12.  
 In addition, art. 81 does not apply to undertakings which are part of the same 
economic entity, for instance when agreements are made between the parent company 
and a subsidiary. A so-called "test of control" has been developed in the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ13, where different factors such as control over the board of directors in the 
subsidiary, the flow of profits to the parent company and to what extent the subsidiary 
follows directions are material. The relationship between a principal and an agent is also 
normally defined as a single economic entity. 
 Art. 81(1) apply to both horizontal and vertical agreements, contrary to the 
popular opinion in the early years of the EC14. This means that anti-competitive 
agreements made between businesses both at the same and different levels of the chain 
of supply are caught by the provision. However, the market share cap set up in the block 
                                                 
11 Case C-41/90 [1991], para 21. Höfner was a case concerning dominance and art. 82, however. See also 
Whish 5th ed., p 81. 
12 OJ [1992] L 326/31 [1994], paras 43-57. 
13 See further Case C73/95P Viho and Jones and Sufrin p 103-107. 
14 See in particular Consten and Grundig, Cases 56/84 and 58/64 [1966], as a paramount judgement where 
vertical agreements were believed to have the ability of infringing art. 81 as well as horizontal 
agreements. 
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exemption for vertical agreements (30% of the market share if no hardcore restrictions 
are found in the agreement), is higher than for horizontal agreements, since the latter 
types of agreements are generally seen as more destructive. 
 Furthermore, the borderline between an "agreement" and "concerted practices" is 
rather vague. If there exists a written agreement between the parties, for instance, the 
relationship is without question an agreement. But even "understandings" and 
"Gentleman's agreements" have been defined as agreements for the purpose of art. 
81(1). However, the difficulties lay not in determining whether something is an 
agreement or a concerted practice, since both are included in the prohibition, but rather 
if it can be labelled collusive or non-collusive behaviour, where the evidence of an 
agreement lack15. An example of the latter can be where the price of products from 
competitors in the same market area fluctuates more or less coincidentally in the same 
pattern, which can be a result of price fluctuations on raw materials, or even a simple 
question of demand. Competing on price is certainly not prohibited. On the other hand, 
fixing the price is a serious, hardcore restriction, as seen in art. 81(1)(a). 
 Briefly, when it comes to decisions by associations of undertakings, this part of 
the prohibition is designed to catch certain collusive activities concluded in different 
trade associations, co-operatives or other bodies, that are harmful to competition, and 
yet fall outside the terms of agreement or concerted practices. In general, this part of the 
prohibition targets the establishment of hidden cartels applying hardcore restrictions as 
for instance market sharing or price fixing.16 
 Although art. 81(1)(a)-(e) set up a list of anti-competitive behaviour, this is not 
meant to be exhaustive, as we can read by the very wording "in particular". However, 
these are viewed as being types of agreements that seriously damages competition. The 
easiest way of distinguishing hardcore agreements from the rest, is by using the 
"object/effect"-test. If the agreement has as its very object to prevent, restrict or distort 
competition, it will often be a hardcore restriction. 
 
 
                                                 
15 See Whish 5th ed. p 94. 
16 Further on the topic, Jones and Sufrin p 118-119 and chapter 11, Whish p 97-99. 
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3.3 Self-assessment: The new application of art. 81 
 Regulation 1/2003 art. 1 paragraph 1 and 2 reads: 
 
 1. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices caught by Article 81(1) of the 
 Treaty which do not satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall be 
 prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required. 
  
 2. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices caught by Article 81(1) of the 
 Treaty which satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall not be 
 prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required. 
 
 In fairly simple language, the words "no prior decision" change the application 
of art. 81 for European firms. Earlier, as mentioned, they would have to apply for either 
a "letter of comfort" or an individual exemption from the Commission. Starting from 
May 1st. 2004, it is all up to themselves to assess the legality of their agreements. This 
new regime has caused some anxiety in European firms; many claim that the new rules 
will introduce more uncertainty. However, the huge delays and "letters of comfort" 
under the old regime were said to cause uncertainty, frustration and confusion as well. 
Now, an agreement is either prohibited or legal, as there is no such thing as an 
individual exemption anymore. 
 It is crucial to underline that not only the companies themselves, but also 
national courts and competition authorities now have to power to directly apply the 
exemptions in art. 81(3), cf. Reg. 1/2003 art. 5 and 6. National competition authorities 
may also end infringements, order interim measures, accept commitments and impose 
fines. 
 When it comes to the self-assessment process, it can be viewed as a four-step 
procedure. First of all, the company must determine whether the agreement is subject to 
art. 81(1) in the first place, for instance in cases where an agreement is made between a 
parent company and a subsidiary, it will not be between undertakings and thus not 
prohibited by art. 81(1)17. The next step will be to search the agreement for possible 
hardcore restrictions of competition, as these are highly unlikely to be allowed in a non-
infringing agreement. Thirdly, block exemptions on the area must be examined, as these 
                                                 
17 Though it can be an art. 82-infringement, if the company's market share is high. 
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can serve as a short-cut around a more extensive art. 81(3)-study. For vertical 
agreements, there is a general block exemption. For more specific agreements, both 
R&D-agreements, specialisation agreements and technology transfer agreements, to 
name a few, have their own EC block exemptions. Finally, if legal certainty still has not 
been achieved, the company must undergo a thorough study of the art. 81(3)-exemption. 
 Art. 81(3) EC reads: 
 
 The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the 
 case of:  
 - any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;  
 - any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;  
 - any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,  
 which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
 promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
 share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:  
 (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
 indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;  
 (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect 
 of a substantial part of the products in question.  
 
 The wording "any" [agreement, decision and concerted practice] clearly states 
that in theory, even hardcore restraints and severely anti-competitive behaviour can 
satisfy the conditions for exemptions. However, these categories of agreements are 
usually highly unlikely to do so.18 
 There are four different conditions for an exemption after art. 81(3). Firstly, the 
agreement must contribute to improving production or distribution of goods or promote 
a technical or economic process. Secondly, it must let the consumers benefit from these 
benefits or improvements. Thirdly and fourthly, as seen in art. 81(3)(a) and (b), any 
restrictions imposed on the party to the agreement must be indispensable, and it must 
not enable the parties to the agreement to obtain a per se monopoly. These conditions 
are as mentioned cumulative; they will all need to be fulfilled. For instance, if 
                                                 
18 One much used exception is cartel-like cooperation in the form of liner conferences in the 
Mediterranean Sea, where hardcore market sharing has been allowed by the Commission. 
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consumers do not benefit from certain improvements, no matter how much the 
companies save from making the agreements, it will not fulfil the criteria for exemption. 
 A more extensive analysis on the criteria of exemption after art. 81 (3) will be 
carried out together with the TTBE-discussion when appropriate over the next chapters. 
4 Regulation 772/2004 on Technology Transfer Agreements 
4.1 The history of art. 81(1) and patent licensing 
 
 The Commission has over the last decades changed its views on the severity of 
patent licensing clauses and possible infringements of art. 81(1), which is now reflected 
in the Commission's different block exemptions. This is a short summary. 
 In the early years of the Community, the Commission's general view was that 
patent licenses very rarely, if at all, could pose any threats to inter-state competition. 
This view was mainly based on the thought that, firstly, intra-brand competition was not 
the primary target in a time where many member states still applied ridiculously 
protective provisions to hinder the free movement of goods and services, and secondly, 
because it believed that a high degree of exclusivity on the hands of the both the 
licensor and the licensee was a necessity in order to even have licensing working as 
intended. This view changed somewhat after the ECJ-ruling in Consten and Grundig v 
Commission19, where the Court not only stated that vertical agreements can be caught 
by art. 81(1), but more importantly in this context, that absolute territorial protection by 
using IPR-rights, when hindering parallel imports and thus intra-brand competition, 
could as well have the ability to infringe. The Consten and Grundig-case, where 
Consten as a trade mark licensee had acquired an exclusive right to use the trade mark 
GINT in France, also established the division between the existence of an IPR-right and 
the exercise of such a right. This would later pave the way for the famous exhaustion of 
rights-doctrine by the ECJ, which in short means that once a product is placed on the 
market by a company which have a legitimate right to do so, the product could as a 
general rule be sold anywhere in the Community. 
                                                 
19 Cases 56/84 and 58/84 [1966] ECR 299, (1966] CMLR 418. 
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 As for territorial protection, the Court hereafter established in a vast number of 
cases20 that both non-competition clauses and resale price maintenance, which is the 
vertical agreements' equivalent to price fixing, were caught by art. 81(1). After a while, 
a pattern emerged, and the Commission drafted the first block exemption for patent 
licenses in 198421, where the most harmful agreement clauses were blacklisted. This 
Regulation was later replaced with Regulation 240/96, which also included a 'white list', 
based on contractual clauses that the Court either did not find infringing, and included 
licensing of know-how and mixed licenses. 
 The Nungesser v Commission22-case, often referred to as 'the Maize Seeds case', 
further broadened the scope. Here, the question before the Court was whether an 
exclusive licence of plant breeders' rights had as its object to restrict competition, as 
referred to in art. 81(1). If this was the case, exclusive licenses would by their very 
nature infringe art. 81(1), and highly unlikely benefit from the exemption in art. 81(3). 
The Court distinguished between a sole licence and an exclusive licence, where a sole 
licence (often referred to as an 'open exclusive licence') merely gives the licensee a 
guarantee that no licence will be given to a competitor in the same area, whereas an 
exclusive licence gives absolute territorial protection. The Court decided that a sole 
licence sometimes was necessary in order to help new companies establish themselves 
in a new, risky and often young market, at the same time as it did not hinder parallel 
imports. Therefore, this type of licences was not viewed as having as an object the 
restriction of competition, thus not being an infringement of art. 81(1). However, the 
Court did in later cases restrict its own doctrine, as well as the Commission was 
reluctant to apply the doctrine. Whish believes that the Commission would rather like to 
exempt territorial exclusivity agreements from art. 81(1) using art. 81(3), than "to grant 
negative clearance under Article 81(1)".23  
 In the last two decades, both the Commission and the Community Courts have 
focused on the division between agreements having as its object the restriction of 
competition, and those which can restrict the competition by effect, where the latter 
often can be exempted under art. 81(3). The introduction of black lists and earlier white 
                                                 
20 See Whish p 739, where at least 11 cases are referred to. 
21 Regulation 2349/84 
22 Case 258/78 [1982] ECR 2015, [1983] 1 CMLR 278. 
23 See Whish p 741. 
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lists in the Commission's different block exemptions can prove this; where severely 
anti-competitive clauses as for instance price fixing or market sharing are put on the 
black lists, milder forms of territorial exclusivity are often open for exemption. 
 
 
4.2 The concept of a block exemption Regulation 
 A block exemption Regulation is a invention in EC law, where the main purpose 
is to construct a framework for private companies, enabling them to apply competition 
rules on a self-regulatory basis. A block exemption is usually aimed at a specific group 
of agreements which typically can be restrictive of competition, but where the negative 
sides are outweighed by positive sides and the agreement as a whole will improve 
economic efficiency and should therefore be exempted, as long as severely anti-
competitive restrictions are not included and the market share is under a certain 
threshold. If the agreement is in line with the block exemption, the parties to the 
agreement in question will obtain a "safe harbour", and will not be accused of infringing 
the competition rules. After Reg. 1/2003, when self-assessment as discussed in last 
chapter became the only solution to get exceptions from art. 81 and 82, block 
exemptions have become of higher importance than ever before. 
 In addition, block exemptions are Regulations, which rank them high in the 
hierarchy of EC provisions, making them directly applicable in the courts of the 
member states, thus making the enforceability a lot smoother. 
  
4.2.1 The main features and purposes of the TTBE 
 
 The TTBE is in many ways a typical EC block exemption. The Regulation itself 
is fairly short with only 20 recitals and 11 articles, while the Guidelines to the block 
exemption24 show the complexity of the field, also granting much space to discuss the 
interpretation of art. 81(3) on the field of technology transfer agreements in cases where 
an agreement falls outside the safe harbour of TTBE. 
                                                 
24 Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements, 2004/C 
101/02. 
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 The subject matter this block exemption regulates are licensing agreements of 
certain technology-related IPRs for the purpose of production, and the legality of these 
in the light of art. 81(1) EC. This block exemption generally works as a safe harbour 
under art. 81(3) EC, thus enabling the parties to a technology transfer agreement to 
assess the legality of said agreement without having to launch a deep analysis of art. 
81(3). As stated in recital 4 to the TTBE, the overall aim of even constructing a block 
exemption on this field, is partly to "ensure effective competition" and partly "providing 
adequate legal security for undertakings".25 
 Technology transfer agreements will in many cases show to improve 
competition and be pro-effective for a number of reasons. They can reduce the problem 
of duplicate research and development work, which often can be both time-consuming 
and costly, thus making future products more expensive to the consumers. Also, such 
agreements often encourages competition in both the product and technology market, as 
well as facilitating diffusion.26 On the other hand, these agreements can also be 
implemented with less noble results in mind. The licensing of technology with a view to 
share the market between the parties, for instance, has shown to be a problem. In 
addition, especially cross-licensing agreements can often work as a barrier of entry to 
competing products and technology, hindering these access to the market, with the 
possible results of both less innovation and higher prices for the consumers. 
 The new TTBE is replacing an old block exemption Regulation on the same 
field, and introduces new rules. Most visible is the abandoning of the so-called "white-
list" in the old Regulation, mentioning certain agreements which normally are 
permitted, and a "black-list" of prohibited agreements. In the new TTBE, there is only a 
list of hardcore restrictions that cannot be included in licensing agreements, in addition 
to a list of "excluded restrictions", which are banned, but which can be removed from 
the agreement, leaving the rest of the agreement valid. 
 In order to benefit from the safe harbour laid down in the TTBE art. 2, the 
agreement in question and the parties must satisfy a number of criteria. Firstly, the 
agreement must be between no more than two parties, which excludes inter alia so-
called pooling of patents. Secondly, the agreement must have as its primary aim the 
transfer of technology, as defined in art. a (b). This fits well in with the block exemption 
                                                 
25 Cf. rec. 4. 
26 Cf. rec. 5. 
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on vertical agreements27, where art. 2(3) together with paragraphs 30-37 in the 
Guidelines on vertical restraints28 exclude inter alia licensing agreements of IPRs from 
the scope of that Regulation.29 Thirdly, the market shares of the parties to the agreement 
must be below certain thresholds, depending on various factors, see art. 3 and chapter 5 
of this paper. Further, the agreement must not contain so-called hardcore restraints, as 
laid down in art. 4 of the TTBE, discussed in chapter 6 of this paper.  
 However, even if an agreement does not benefit from the TTBE, there is no 
presumption for illegality under art. 81(1) as such, but will have to undergo a more 
extensive self-analysis by the parties to the agreement under art. 81(3) EC. This is 
clearly stated both in the Guidelines and in the recitals to the TTBE. 
 
4.3 The scope of the Regulation 
 Contrary to other EC-provisions, the TTBE does not include a separate article 
which defines the scope of the Regulation. In legal terms, art. 1(1)(b) must be read in 
conjunction with art. 2 first paragraph in order to define the scope. Art. 1(1)(b) is a part 
of an article concerning definitions, and a 'technology transfer agreement' is defined as a 
"patent licensing agreement, a know-how licensing agreement, a software copyright 
licensing agreement or a mixed patent, know-how or software copyright licensing 
agreement...". In general, this block exemption covers licensing of technology "where 
the licensor permits the licensee to exploit the licensed technology for the production of 
goods or services", cf. paragraph 1 of the Guidelines. An agreement can be a simple 
agreement, a decision of an association of undertakings or a concerted practice, which 
covers the same forms of cooperation as art. 81 EC, as discussed earlier. Excluded are 
 
4.3.1 Patents, know-how and mixed agreements 
 The term 'patents' in TTBE does, according to art. 1(h), cover a wide range of 
registered models; topographies of semiconductors and plant breeder's certificates, to 
name a few. On a rather more general level, patents are recognisable by two main 
                                                 
27 Commission Regulation No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81 (3) of the 
Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices. 
28 Commission Notice 2000/C 291/01: Guidelines on vertical restraints. 
29 Cf. para 34 of the Guidelines on vertical restraints.  
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features. Firstly, a patent must be applied for and registered in order to be valid, 
contrary to for instance copyright, which arise the very same second as a artistic work is 
created. Patents will also only be valid in the territory it has been registered in, while 
copyright gives an universal protection. Luckily, the EU has established a "one-stop-
shop" for patents, which means that a patent registered, thus satisfying the requirements 
for registration in one of the member states, will be valid for the entire Community. 
Secondly, the requirements normally expected for a patent to be valid, are that the 
patentable subject matter is an invention, that this invention is "susceptible for industrial 
application", that the invention is new, and that it involves an "inventive step".30 
 Know-how, on the other hand, can be identified by almost the opposite features, 
cf. TTBE art. 1(i)(I)-(III). Where patents are required to be registered, know-how must 
not be generally known or easily accessible (the requirement of secrecy), in addition to 
being unpatentable. In addition, know-how must be substantial and significant for the 
production, and clearly identified. In art. 1(i) of the TTBE, know-how is dubbed "a 
package of non-patented practical information, resulting from experience and testing...". 
 A mixture of patents and know-how seems to be the rule rather than the 
exception in technology transfer agreements. In many cases, the mere technical 
drawings, for instance, will not provide the licensee with enough information to apply 
the technology in question. It can often be helpful for the licensee to obtain access to 
practical, non-patentable information concerning for instance the production process, or 
to which traps to avoid.  
 
4.3.2 Computer software 
 
 Being probably the most debated topic in IPR-regulation in the EC over the last 
couple of years, the patentability of computer software is luckily not a topic in the case 
of TTBE; the Regulation merely include the licensing of computer software in its 
subject-matter, cf. art. 1(1)(b) on the definition of a technology transfer agreement. This 
is, however, an important step, since a growing number of industrial processes rely on 
software in the production of goods, the execution of services or development, 
especially when such processes are more or less automated. A software licence 
                                                 
30 Cf. the European Patent Convention, art. 52. 
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agreement will then enable the licensee to utilise the same method of production as the 
licensor, and such a licence may then have the same benefits or downsides to 
competition as the licensing of patents. Therefore, there are no practical reasons why 
computer software should be left out of the TTBE. However, as the main protection for 
computer software today in the EC is still copyright31, and not patent, there may arise 
some problems concerning among other things possible modification made by the 
licensee. Since patents work more or less as recipes, and give the licensor a protection 
against copying the very ideas behind the patented invention, copyright merely give 
protection against the copying of the expression. This is the reason why we for example 
still have competing operating systems for computers, although they look similar.  
 Also, as Mario Monti emphasised in his speech prior to the adoption of the new 
TTBE; "There is no consensus on further broadening the scope to also include copyright 
in general and trade marks". This is partly due to the fact that, according to Council 
Regulation 19/65, the Commission has no powers to block exempt anything else than 
industrial property rights. 
 
4.3.3 The typical licensing agreement - A short overview 
 
 When a company or a person obtains a patent certificate (or any other IPR right), 
there are four ways ahead. One solution is simply to do nothing, thus only enforcing the 
negative right inherent in an intellectual property right; the right do deny anyone else 
the benefits of using the knowledge in question. Another way is to decide to solely 
manufacture the patentable subject-matter, and by doing this, using the positive right of 
having a monopoly for a time-limited period. A third way can be to assign the patent 
right, de facto selling the IPR right. The fourth way is to license the knowledge to a 
third party, finding a middle way between assignment and sole manufacturing. As Jones 
and Sufrin points out32, licensing must be distinguished from subcontracting, where the 
aim of the agreement is merely to get a third party to produce a component or carry out 
a vital process related to the production of the goods in question. In addition, 
                                                 
31 See the Software Directive (91/250/EEC) and the Database Directive (96/9/EC). Also, computer 
software "as such" is for the time being excluded from the subject matter in the European Patent 
Convention, see art. 52. 
32 Jones & Sufrin, p 575. 
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subcontracting very rarely fall under art. 81(1), even if know-how is being transferred 
between the producer and the subcontractor. 
 Licensing usually involves a licensee obtaining permission from a licensor to 
produce, sell or incorporate into a product or a process technology which is owned and 
legally protected by the licensor. There can be many reasons why a company wishes to 
grant a license, instead of manufacturing the product itself. He may not have the 
production facilities, storage capacity, access to a distribution network or a geographic 
location that make it profitable to make the product itself. The licensor may be a 
recently established company with few assets and weak economic muscles, controlling 
no property apart from the intellectual ones. On the other end of the scale, some 
companies have such a size that worldwide sales will be the next step. In such cases, 
granting a license can be the best way of getting inside foreign markets in other parts of 
the world, possibly protected by custom rates designed in favour of nationally produced 
goods. By licensing, the owner of the IPR right in question can also continue the 
production himself. In addition, licensing can reduce the risks taken by the producer if 
the product does not hit well with the customers. 
 Likewise, there are a number of factors which can encourage a company to 
obtain a license and become a licensee. It will often get the benefit of the experience 
already gained by the licensor, sometimes both in the manufacturing process and in 
other fields. Also, it is less expensive than actually buying the company that holds the 
intellectual property, at the same time that R&D has already been done and paid for. 
Finally, most licensing agreements are designed in a way that makes the license itself 
fairly inexpensive, while royalties are paid as the product in fact starts to sell. 
 However, certain downsides to licensing must be acknowledged. There may be 
passages in the licensing agreement that prevents the licensee from developing similar 
product on its own, as well as the life-span of a license have a tendency to be rather 
long, consistently forcing the licensee to pay royalties and live under a possibly harsh 
regime of restraints from the licensor. In addition, nobody ever knows how long the 
licensed product will be a big hit in the market. To live under licensing clauses for 
years, while the product only sells for a few months, is rarely a good position to be 
caught in. 
 What is usually included in and covered by a license, can differ greatly. In terms 
of the subject matter itself, at least for the purpose of technology transfer agreements, 
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this is determined by the TTBE art. 1(1). In other types of licensing agreements and 
under other legal regimes, both copyright and trademarks will often be included. 
 Obviously, a well tailored agreement will state exactly what will be transferred, 
thus avoiding any misinterpretation on this stage. Secondly, it will be useful to include 
exactly which obligations the licensor has in the agreement, for instance to what extent 
he will assist the licensee in technical support, co-operation and enclosure of future 
improvements. Then, the licensee's obligations must be stated, often in terms of what 
payments will be made, the level of secrecy and other requirements. In terms of 
payments, the sum may be a so-called lump sum (a one-time payment), but more often 
it is being agreed upon a combination of a fee and royalty, a percentage of each unit 
sold, which can for instance rise if the number of sold units exceeds certain thresholds. 
Also, it is common to define in which geographical areas the licensee can manufacture 
and sell the licensed products. This is a field to be careful in terms of avoiding plain 
market sharing or allocation of customers, and I will get back to this topic under the 
discussion on the hardcore restrictions in chapter 6. 
 Guarantees, on both sides may be agreed, although the licensor very rarely will 
provide a general guarantee on the very results of using the licensed rights. Most 
frequently, the licensee will provide warranties and public liabilities. 
 Finally, a licensing agreement should include a passage on termination, either on 
grounds of possible infringements of the agreed clauses, or in terms of a time-limited 
period where the licensee shall seize to enjoy the license. 
5 Market shares and definitions of the relevant market 
 
5.1 Introduction: The de minimis agreements 
 
 Anti-competitive behaviour does not automatically mean that a company has 
overstepped art. 81. If the market shares of the parties to the agreement in question are 
so low that their behaviour is unlikely to have any impact on the market, the 
Commission will in most cases not act at all. For instance, if two companies jointly 
controlling 2% of the product market decide to fix prices, the agreement will only mean 
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that they probably will see their market share decline even further, as their consumers 
will change supplier when the price undisputedly starts to rise. 
 These considerations are reflected in the de minimis-doctrine, first applied by the 
ECJ in the case of Völk v. Vervaecke33, which concerned an exclusive distribution 
agreement for washing machines between the German producer Völk and the Belgian 
distributor Vervaecke, where Völk only controlled between 0.2 and 0.5% of the relevant 
product market. Also covering agreements with an 'object' to distort competition, even 
agreements containing hardcore restraints are exempted. 
 Based on both case-law and common sense, the Commission's Notice on 
agreements of minor importance34 was created to inform and guide businesses on where 
the line should be drawn. However soft-law, the Notice clarifies the de minimis-
doctrine on several points, and applies to all of the three different types of agreements in 
art. 81(1). Firstly, it distinguishes between agreements made between competitors and 
non-competitors. While competitors fall outside the Notice if their combined market 
share exceed 10% of the relevant market, non-competitors are allowed a generous 
threshold of a 15% market share each.35 Secondly, and most importantly, hardcore 
restraints in the agreements are not tolerated, namely price fixing, output limitation and 
market sharing and allocation for competitors, and resale price maintenance and certain 
bans on active sales for non-competitors. 
 It is important to underline that the Notice on agreements of minor importance is 
nothing close to an exhaustive set of rules on this field, but only a way to "...qualif[y], 
with the help of market share thresholds, what is not an appreciable restriction of 
competition under Article 81".36 As the Commission states in paragraph 3 of the Notice, 
"Agreements may in addition not fall in under Article 81(1) because they are not 
capable of appreciably affecting trade between member states. This notice does not deal 
with this issue". Further, the Commission suggests that agreements between small- and 
medium-sized companies rarely affect trade between member states, suggesting that 
undertakings employing fewer than 250 people and having less than 40 million Euro as 
                                                 
33 Case 5/69 [1969] ECR 295, [1969]. 
34 2001/C 368/07, full name "Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not 
appreciably restrict competition under Article 81 (1) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community". 
35 See the Notice paragraph 7 (a) and (b). 
36 See the Notice paragraph 2. 
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an annual turnover, should as a general rule not be viewed as influential enough to 
impact inter-state trade. 
 Also, the so-called NAAT-rule (not appreciably affecting trade), as proposed in 
a Draft Commission Notice in 2003, suggests a market share cap of 5% of the relevant 
product market of the very product the agreement concerns, and less than 40 million 
Euro in turnover a year as a completely safe harbour. As Philip Lowe, the Director 
General of DG COMP in the Commission stated during a lecture in Barcelona in 
200337: "This NAAT-rule is specific to the jurisdictional criterion of effect on trade and 
distinct from the policy orientations in the Commission Notice on agreements of minor 
importance, which do not appreciably restrict competition (the —de minimis notice“). 
The latter, in line with its full name, only concerns the question of whether there is no 
appreciable restriction of competition".  
 As a result, the NAAT-rule does not, as the de minimis-notice, exclude 
agreements that contains hardcore restraints. This is underlined in paragraph 50 of the 
Draft Notice, where it is pointed out that "The NAAT-rule  applies to all agreements 
within the meaning of Article 81(1) irrespective of the nature of the restrictions 
contained in the agreement, including restrictions that have been identified as hardcore 
restrictions in Commission block exemption regulations and guidelines". This rule can 
prove to be important, as a vast number of agreements are being made between firms 
which have no real market power, and therefore might have been containing themselves 
in their agreements until now. 
 
5.2 Market share caps in the TTBE, Article 3 
 
 As referred to in last chapter, the Draft Regulation released by the Commission 
in the late fall of 2003 received some harsh criticism on its, as some firms believed, 
overemphasis on market shares alone. In the final Regulation, it is being distinguished 
between agreement made between two non-competitors and competing firms. For the 
latter, the combined market share must according to art. 3(1) not exceed 20% of the 
relevant market in order to benefit from the block exemption. It is important to keep in 
                                                 
37 The full text can be obtained at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ 
speeches/text/sp2003_035_en.pdf [October 4th. 2004]. 
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mind that "relevant market" in this context includes both the relevant product market 
and the relevant technology market.  
 The fact that the new TTBE focuses on the combined market share of the parties 
to the agreement, has caused some reactions when a large number of businesses, 
industry and others (more than 70 in total) submitted their comments already in the 
spring of 2002. To name one example, the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer complained that 
the rule of combined market share will have as a result that, de facto, no market leader 
can ever obtain a safe harbour under the TTBE, no matter how small market share the 
licensee has.38 The result being, bear in mind, not an outright prohibition, but a more 
extensive process, where the company needs to assess the legality of the agreement 
under art. 81(3). However, it can be pointed out that market leaders, with their size, 
experience and legal muscles, should be most qualified to make such an evaluation, 
rather than somewhat smaller sized firms. 
 Following art. 3(2), non-competitors have the possibility of being slightly more 
dominant; the safe harbour prevail if neither have a market share over 30% of the 
relevant market. It will be crucial to note that in art. 3(2), it is each party's market share 
that is of interest, and not the combined share. As mentioned earlier, the rationale 
behind this somewhat unequal treatment is the mere fact that cooperation between 
competitors, who by their very nature are supposed to compete and not cooperate, is 
viewed as being more harmful to competition than for instance licensing between two 
firms which operate in completely different sectors. Also, the market share threshold is 
here the same as in the block exemption for vertical agreements39, creating a lex 
specialis on the field of technology transfer, as most non-competitors in these 
agreements are at a different level of production. 
 In art. 3(3), the method of calculating the parties' share of the relevant 
technology market is outlined; the market share is "defined in terms of the presence of 
the licensed technology on the relevant product market(s)". In other words, the market 
share for a certain drug held by for instance the licensor and one of ten licensees, when 
                                                 
38 Pfizer's comments can, together with many others received by the Commission, be found at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/technology_transfer_2/ [Valid October 2nd. 2004] 
39 Regulation 2790/1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices. 
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these are competing, shall be calculated on basis of the market share the licensor and the 
licensee in question have of the total market. 
 If the licensing agreement is so successful that the market share of the parties, or 
on of them, rises above the market share caps, they will continue to enjoy the safe 
harbour the first year of the agreement, and two more years, as stated in art. 8(2) of the 
TTBE. 
 
5.3 How to define the relevant market: Main rule and the TTBE-specific 
provisions 
 
 Agreements between companies can be more or less harmful to competition 
depending on the very nature of the agreement in question, and the restraints inherent in 
it. However, even the most extreme anti-competitive agreement will never constitute an 
infringement to the EC competition provisions if the parties to that agreement have no 
substantial market power. 
 Defining a company's market share is a two-step process. Firstly, the relevant 
market must be defined. Secondly, the market share must be calculated. This process is 
more complicated than it would appear at first glance, especially defining the relevant 
market in the TTBE, where both the product market and the technology market must be 
considered. The purpose of this part of the chapter is to explain how the relevant market 
can be defined when two companies engage in a licensing agreement, and later how the 
market share of the companies may be calculated. 
 The general rule on market definition in EC law is reflected in the Commission's 
Notice on the definition of the relevant market.40 This text, however soft law, provides a 
good overview over the Commission's approach to market definition. In paragraph 2 in 
the Notice, it is pointed out that market definition is a "tool to identify and define the 
boundaries of competition between firms". In the same paragraph, the Commission 
emphasise that both the product market and the geographic market must be taken into 
consideration when defining the relevant product market, however, constrains from 
potential competition cannot be measured this easily. Following para. 13 of the Notice, 
both demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential competition must be 
                                                 
40 OJ C 372, 09/12/1997. 
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assessed. In paras. 7 and 8 in the Notice, the relevant product and geographical markets 
are defined. According to para. 7, the relevant product market "...comprises all those 
products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the 
consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use". 
The geographic counterpart is defined in para. 8, as comprising "...the area in which the 
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, 
in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be 
distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are 
appreciably different in those areas". 
 In this chapter, I will start by explaining the idea of market power, the general 
methods of measuring the relevant product and geographical markets, and then show the 
specific market definition and considerations included in the TTBE. 
   
5.3.1 Market power 
 
 Central in the determination of market power is the economic term of demand 
elasticity. In short, this concerns whether or not a company can raise the prices for its 
products or services without losing sales. This is determined by a number of factors, for 
instance, the company's market share in the relevant market, the number of competitors 
in that market and the number and level of barriers to entry and exit.  
 Having market power, however tempting it may sound, is believed to be the 
greatest threat to competition. Companies which have obtained market power, and 
exercising it, create a unhealthy competition environment and can be responsible for 
raised prices for the consumers. In dominance cases, the exercise of that power is the 
greatest concern, since having dominance is not a sin in itself. However, in the ECMR, 
the mere possibility of a company gaining market power by merging can be enough for 
the Commission to stop a concentration. And in cases concerning horizontal or vertical 
agreements between companies in art. 81, it is the gaining of market power through 
agreements which is the main topic. Here, too, it is the possibility of two companies 
gaining too much market power by cooperation that is enough to deem the agreement 
prohibited after art. 81(1) and void after art. 81(2). 
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5.3.2 Barriers to entry and exit 
  
 Being part of the big picture of market power, barriers to entry and exit can 
easily be forgotten, though this is the very core of the topic. If a company has a 
dominant share of the market, this can be lost even before it can abuse its dominance or 
engage in agreements with hardcore restraints, if there are no barriers to entry en exit. 
 This can be illustrated by what has happened on the software market the last 20 
years. In 1984, Apple had almost monopoly in home-computer software. In 1995, 
nearly 100% of all internet browsers in the world were produced by Netscape. Today, 
Microsoft has a monopoly in both sectors. This can happen because the barriers of entry 
and exit have been historically low in this industry. The transportation cost of the 
product is almost zero, national legislating has mostly been harmonised and the 
production itself requires no factories - in theory only a CD-writer. The cost of 
establishing a software company is low; all that is needed is really an office and a 
computer. To penetrate foreign markets, licensing can be used. Then, if the plans do not 
work out, sunk costs are rarely high. Computer software is protected by copyright and 
generally not patents, which means that "stealing" ideas from others, as Microsoft did in 
both the examples above, is allowed, as long as the "expression" is not copied. 
 According to Whish, the Oxford dictionary defines barriers to entry as "laws, 
institutions, or practices which make it difficult or impossible for new firms to enter 
some markets...".41 A better legal definition has been put forward by Jones and Sufrin, 
where Stigler from the so-called Chicago-school defines barriers of entry as "...a cost of 
producing (at some or every rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks 
to enter the industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry".42 The first 
definition does for instance not distinguish between cases where it is hard to gain access 
(high sunk start-up costs, many competitors, high degree of anti-competitive agreements 
between existing firms) and cases where it is impossible to get into the market, for 
instance due to IPR-rights which confers a legal monopoly. 
 Another topic for debate has been whether the barriers of entry are only barriers 
for new firms at this point in time, or if it also includes barriers that any firm had to 
battle at some point, as for instance the costs used on advertisement to establish the firm 
                                                 
41 Whish 2003 p 44. 
42 Jones & Sufrin p 53. 
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in the market. In the EU, the Commission has adopted a wide definition, as shown for 
instance in numerous cases under art. 82. 
 
 
5.3.3 The relevant product market 
 
 For many firms, the result of a definition of the product market can prove to be 
rather surprising. With an extremely narrow definition, almost any producer can be said 
to not only overstep the thresholds of the TTBE, but almost end up as a monopolist. 
This can be illustrated again by the cases of Continental Can and United Brands, 
although these were dominance-cases under art. 82. In Continental Can, the 
Commission found that metal cans for fish, meat and metal tops belonged to different 
product markets, thus choosing a very narrow product market definition. However, the 
Commission failed to justify its interpretation to the ECJ on appeal. In United Brands, 
the ECJ laid down the legal test of interchargability; The question whether bananas 
were part of the fruit market or the banana market boiled down to whether bananas had 
"special features distinguishing [them] from other fruit that [are] only to a limited extent 
interchangeable with them". In this example, the difference between the market share of 
the narrow market and a wider market can be rather big. In effect, a well proved wide 
definition of the relevant product market delivered by the company can save it from 
both monopoly proceedings and from exceeding market share thresholds in block 
exemptions. 
 If products are interchangeable, they belong as a main rule to the same product 
market. Interchargability is, as mentioned in the Notice on the relevant market, based on 
the idea that products can be divided into groups of similar products if they "share the 
same characteristics" (Continental Can) or are "singled out by such special features..." 
(United Brands). 
 When two products are found to be interchangeable, they belong to the same 
product market, thus the borders of the product market are expanded to comprise two 
products rather than one. To illustrate this, we can imagine a company producing pens 
with blue ink, which has a market share of 40% in the market for blue pens. If blue pens 
are found to be interchangeable with for instance pens with black ink, and another 
company has a market share of 40% in that part of the market, the two companies will 
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each have a market share of only 20% of the total market (provided that the sales value 
of blue and black pens were roughly the same). In this example, the companies moved 
from dominance after art. 82 to within the borders of most EC block exemptions, 
including the TTBE's market share cap for competing firms, simply because the market 
definition widened the relevant product market. 
 
 
5.3.3.1 Demand-side substitutability 
 
 In order to measure interchargability, reliable data must be collected, and a 
common market definition must be found. The introduction of both the self-assessment 
regime, the new block exemptions and the new European Community Merger 
Regulation (ECMR), which all focuses on market shares, has indirectly made this 
process more important than ever before. 
 The main part of this measurement is that of demand-side substitutability. The 
core of this is explained in the Notice paras. 15-17, where this assessment "entails a 
determination of the range of products which are viewed as substitutes by the 
consumers". Vital in this context is then not only the characteristics of the products 
themselves, but also whether the consumers can switch between them. For the purpose 
of determining this, the so-called "SSNIP-test" has been developed. This test, first 
invented and applied in the USA, is based on a situation where the product in question 
has a hypothetical price-rise; a Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price 
(SSNIP). The question will thereafter be whether the consumers would switch to a 
similar and less expensive product. If they do so, the product market must be wider and 
comprise more than only the first product. The level of the increase in price is generally 
believed to be in the range of 5-10% of the retail price, this is also suggested in para. 17 
of the Notice. 
 The SSNIP-test does also apply in the measuring of the relevant technology 
market in the TTBE, cf. para. 22 of the Guidelines to the TTBE. Here, the question will 
be whether the licensee will switch to other technologies if the price (for instance the 
initial sum or the royalties) is increased. 
 However, the SSNIP-test must be applied with caution. Also dubbed "the 
hypothetical monopoly test", the test will generate plain wrong results if the product in 
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question is already priced superficially high. This effect, often referred to as "the 
Cellophane Phallacy"43, or "own price elasticity", occurs when consumers are presently 
at a point where they are ready to completely discontinue the purchase of the product, 
due to an already superficially high price, something that can easily happen in a 
monopoly-like situation. Although they stop buying product A in this situation, they 
will not necessarily switch to product B, but choose to live without the product, or 
replace it with something they would not normally choose. In the Du Pont-case, the 
monopolist company argued that the market for cellophane was part of a bigger market 
for packaging materials in general. By applying the SSNIP-test, Du Pont could not raise 
the price without losing customers. However, this was not due to effective competition, 
but rather that this cross-elasticity, where consumers switch between products, took 
place because the price was already too high. Had it been at a normal, competitive level, 
the consumers would not have switched to the other products.44 To make a rather 
extreme example; if the price of meat was at a monopoly-like level, then raised by 10%, 
and customers chose to buy yellow turnips and pretend this was meat, would not mean 
that meat belonged to the same market as yellow turnips. 
 Applying the SSNIP-test will therefore, in certain cases, make us believe that the 
relevant product market is wider than it really is. 
 
 
5.3.3.2 Supply-side substitutability 
  
 Though less important than demand-side substitutability, supply-side 
substitutability must nevertheless be taken into consideration in a market analysis. The 
main question in this relation is, judging from para. 20 in the Notice, whether suppliers 
(other than the current ones) can switch production to the product in question in 
response to the same small, but permanent increase in price. In many cases, supply-side 
substitutability is simply a question of "quasi-potential" competition; if it becomes more 
profitable, can other suppliers start the manufacture of the product "without incurring 
                                                 
43 After the Du Pont-case, which concerned domination in the cellophane market. 
44 See further on the whole topic Bishop & Walker p 49 and Jones & Sufrin p 46-48. 
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significant additional costs or risks"?45 The most common example46, is the one on 
paper production. Shifting production from a cheap to a slightly more expensive paper 
quality can be done without major changes. In such cases, the products belong to the 
same product market. 
 As Whish points out47, where cases are more complex than the paper-example, it 
is really a question of market power, rather than one of market definition, as applied in 
US antitrust practice. Market power determination comes at a later stage in the process, 
and does undoubtedly contain market share-related consideration. However, even if a 
company has a market share of 100 %, it will never be viewed as for instance dominant, 
if the potential competition is high and the barriers of entry and exit are at a minimum. 
But a company like that will never benefit from the safe harbour in the TTBE, since one 
of the main qualifications here is based on market shares, and not market power. 
 
 
5.3.4 The relevant geographical market 
 
 At first glance, art. 3 of the TTBE does not seem to care about the relevant 
geographical market. However, in para. 20 of the Guidelines, it is explained that the 
term "product market" refers to goods and service markets "in both their geographic and 
product dimension". 
 The geographical market can be rather difficult to assess, simply because the EU 
is intended to be a single market where goods and services shall move freely across the 
borders. It would then seem as the Community itself is always the relevant market, if 
not a part of a world market for some products. But national markets still exist within 
the Union, as shown for instance in the TV-listings-case48, where the relevant 
geographical market was Ireland and Northern Ireland, since the TV-channels in 
question primarily where offered in this particular area. In the Volvo/Scania merger 
decision, the Commission denied the merger partly because it found that it existed a 
                                                 
45 Cf. the Notice para 20. 
46 See for instance the Notice para 22. 
47 Whish 2003, p 32-33. 
48 Case T-69/89 etc RTE v Commission [1991] ECR II-485, [1991] 4 CMLR 586. 
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national, Swedish market for trucks and buses, and that this market was separate from 
the European market. 
 Quite often, the products or services themselves determine to what extent the 
market can be Union-wide. Milk, for instance, have a short life-span, while computer 
programs can easily be distributed worldwide. Sometimes, but rarely because of art. 28 
and the single market imperative, national laws in some member states set limits to the 
geographical market. Swedish "snus" is for instance banned in the rest of the Union. 
Language barriers play in as well; a Dutch television program or a book will probably 
not be a part of a Union-wide market, unless translated. Other factors can also play in, 
as for example transportation costs and different taste and habits throughout the 
Community. 
 Also on the field of geographic market analysis, the SSNIP-test can be applied. 
If consumers switch to foreign producers if the price of a certain product rises 
nationally, the market must be geographically more widely defined. This is well 
illustrated by both parallel imports and the strange phenomenon of Europeans crossing 
borders to shop typically tax-sensitive goods as alcohol and tobacco in other member 
states which impose lower taxes on these goods. In such cases, the market is certainly 
wider than each member state only. 
 Demand fluctuations are also of importance, constructing a "temporal market" in 
certain cases. This mostly applies to season-sensitive goods and services, as for instance 
fruits, organised holidays to Greek islands or wrapping-paper for Christmas gifts. In 
United Brands, bananas where found to be less popular in summer, when other fruits 
could be bought cheaply, thus suggesting no market power in that particular season. 
This was, however, not dealt with by the ECJ, and the Commission refused to 
acknowledge such a temporal market in this case.  
 
5.3.5 TTBE: The relevant product and technology market 
 
 If two companies are trying to get a safe harbour for their licensing agreement 
under the rules of the TTBE, however, not only the product market, but also the 
technology market is of importance. As mentioned in paragraph 20 of the Guidelines to 
the TTBE, technology is an input integrated in a product or a production process. 
Therefore, licensing agreements can affect the competition in the product market for 
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goods and services as well as in the market for similar technologies. To name an 
example, if the companies A and B enter an agreement concerning the licensing of a 
software codex for compressing music files, where company A is engaged solely in 
computer technology whereas company B only produces a certain device for playback 
of music, the agreement does not only affect the market for such devices, but also the 
market of competing technologies for music compression, and possibly also other 
markets. 
 As a general rule in EC competition law, the relevant market must be defined 
first. In the field of technology transfer, the parties to an agreement can be either 
competitors or non-competitors, with a respective market share cap of 20% and 30%. 
The distinction between competitors and non-competitors needs an explanation. As a 
main rule, the parties to an agreement are competitors on the relevant product market if 
they are actual or potential suppliers of competing products. On the technology market, 
however, they will only be competitors by means of actual competition; in other words 
if the parties license technology that compete (as substitutes in the same relevant 
product market). Therefore, as a combination of product and technology markets, they 
will only have the relief of being non-competitors after the TTBE if the licensor is 
neither an actual nor a potential supplier of the products and the licensee is currently not 
licensing a competing technology.49 This distinction will be important not only in terms 
of market shares, but also in connection to the banned hardcore restraints, which differ 
somewhat between competitors and non-competitors. 
 As Monti has explained50, the licensee does not become a competitor of the 
licensor simply by producing under the license. The problem is, however, that the two 
parties can become competitors during the life-span of the agreement for other reasons, 
for instance if the licensee develops its own, competing technology, and then start to 
produce and possibly license this technology to third-parties. This is inter alia reflected 
in art. 4(3) of the TTBE, where the hardcore restraints that applied to non-competitors 
shall continue to apply for the rest of the life-span of the agreement, even though the 
parties become competitors, provided that the agreement is not "subsequently amended 
in any material respect".51 In paragraph 31 of the Guidelines, the Commission states that 
                                                 
49 Cf. art. 1 (j) (i-ii) of the TTBE. 
50 Monti's speech, page 4, 4th. para. 
51 Cf. art. 4 (3). 
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it will "mainly focus on the impact of the agreement on the licensee's ability to exploit 
his own (competing) technology", which is the view that has been materialised in art. 
4(3). Also, if the licensor enters the product market where the licensee already has been 
active after the agreement was concluded, the hardcore list for non-competitors will still 
apply.52 
 After the relevant market has been assessed, the market share must be 
calculated, or as it is put in the Guidelines, para. 23; "Once relevant markets have been 
defined, market shares can be assigned to the various sources of competition in the 
market and used as an indication of the relative strength of market players". As laid 
down in art. 8 of the TTBE, it is the market sales value data that as a general rule will be 
the basis for this calculation, and not the mere units sold. However, art. 8(1) second 
paragraph suggests that in some circumstances, when sales value data are unavailable, 
other sources must be used. The solution is to use "other reliable market information"53, 
where sales volumes is pointed out as the main source. This rule does not seem to be 
exhaustive, suggesting that also other types of market information can be used. 
Following art. 8(1) third paragraph, the data used shall relate to "the preceding calendar 
year".  
 One method to calculate a technology's market share is put forward in the 
Guidelines paragraph 23; the market share of each type of technology can be calculated 
on the basis of the total income from royalties gained from licensing of that particular 
technology, since one would not think sales value can be used when measuring the 
income from technology only. However, as pointed out in the Guidelines, this method is 
rather theoretical, and the size of the royalties can be more or less secret. Therefore, the 
solution used in art. 3(3) of the TTBE, is in fact to calculate on the basis of the sales 
value of all products incorporating the technology in question, even competing 
technologies that are not being licensed, which is the same approach chosen in 
paragraph 70. This way, potential competition can also be measured, as other firms on 
the relevant product market, which can easily start licensing their own technology if the 
price of licenses increase, will be included as well. And equally important: a high 
income from licenses does not necessarily mean that the company has market power. In 
                                                 
52 Cf. para. 31 i.f. 
53 Cf. art. 8 (1) 2nd. para. 
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addition, this excludes technology which is only used in-house, cf. art. 3(3) of the 
TTBE.  
6 Hardcore restraints 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 As stated in rec. 5 to the TTBE, licensing agreements are usually not regarded to 
be among the most anti-competitive agreements in the eyes of the Commission. On the 
contrary, they "will usually improve economic efficiency and be pro-competitive"54. 
However, to benefit from this block exemption, the group of agreements in question 
must "be assumed with sufficient certainty" to fall under the exemption in art. 81(3), cf. 
rec. 9. And, both in line with the jurisprudence of the ECJ and earlier block exemptions, 
there are a number of agreement clauses which typically can be viewed as being 
severely anti-competitive, and which at the same time cannot be said to be 
"indispensable to the improvement of production or distribution", cf. rec. 13. And even 
agreements clauses which fall under the TTBE in the first place, can have their safe 
harbours withdrawn by the Commission at any given time, provided that the effects of 
the agreement shows to be anti-competitive, cf. art. 6 of the TTBE and rec. 16. 
 Nevertheless, as we shall witness in this chapter, will a hardcore restraint indeed 
not be a fixed term. As explained in para. 74 of the Guidelines, the definition of a 
restriction as hardcore is "based on the nature of the restriction and experience showing 
that such restrictions are almost always anti-competitive". Further, both the objective of 
the agreement clause in question and circumstances in the individual case will play in. 
 In the TTBE, different levels of severity are assigned to respectively agreements 
between competitors and agreements between non-competitors, the latter type of 
agreements having much resemblance with vertical agreements, which has been given 
their own, quite generous block exemption. This different treatment is noticeable in 
mainly two ways. Firstly, as mentioned in chapter 4 and 5, the market share caps are 
                                                 
54 Cf. rec. 5. 
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different. Secondly, and closely linked to the main topic in this chapter, the hardcore 
restraints are defined differently.   
 In the case of technology transfer, not only the product market is crucial in order 
to distinguish between competitors and non-competitors, but also the technology 
market. The result is that if two companies are not competitors in the product market, 
but still utilise the same technology, they will be treated as competitors. 
 Contrary to the so-called excluded restrictions will there be no severability for 
hardcore restraints, in other words; the problematic clause can not be "cut out of" the 
agreement, while the rest of the agreement is block exempted. The result is therefore 
that the agreement as a whole falls outside the block exemption if it contains a hardcore 
restriction, cf. the Guidelines para. 75. With this in mind, the main critisism the 
Commission received after publishing its draft of the TTBE in October 2003, was that 
the hardcore list was "over-inclusive"55, and therefore probably would not facilitate 
licensing the way it was intended to. This was particulary visible in terms of licensing 
between competitors, where for instance non-reciprocal licensing between competitors 
now is treated less dogmatic. Also, the hardcore list in the draft Regulation included all 
passive and active sales bans in agreements between competitors, however non-
reciprocal the agreement might be, a feature which is also changed in the final text. 
 To explore the limits of the hardcore restraints, it will be necessary to draw lines 
to general interpretation of art. 81(3), as shown in the Guidelines. This will be done 
when appropriate throughout this chapter. 
 Finally, as repeatedly stated by the Commission; even a hardcore restriction can 
in theory be exempted under art. 81(3), since no agreements are excluded from this 
article per se, even if such a result would be highly unlikely and has shown to be 
extremely rare in the history of the EC competition regime. 
 
6.2 Agreements between competitors 
 
 The hardcore restrictions in agreements between competitors are placed within 
the very core of the TTBE, since such agreements are those which possibly can pose the 
greatest risk to competition. In agreements between competitors, there is a distinction 
                                                 
55 See World Competition Law and Economics review, vol. 27, No. 3 p 351 
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between so-called reciprocal and non-reciprocal agreements, where the first are 
agreements containing cross-licensing of technology, if such cross licensing concerns 
competing technologies that can be used in the production of competing products. 
Therefore, if competing technology used for producing non-competing products are 
being cross-licensed, the licensing agreement will be a non-reciprocal one. If only one 
party license technology, the agreement will be non-reciprocal as well, cf. para. 78 of 
the Guidelines. The mere licensing of improvement from one of the parties, or a grant-
back obligation, does not make the agreement reciprocal. However, if either the licensor 
or the licensee at a later stage agree on a second license between the same parties, 
especially if this is done shortly after the first license, the agreement will become 
reciprocal. This distinction will prove to be important, as the rules in art. 4 are generally 
stricter for reciprocal agreements, as these can be used to set up a cartel or other market 
allocation arrangements. 
 In the field of licensing between competitors, there are five types of clauses 
which can be said to be hardcore restraints. As stated in art. 4(1), price fixing, limitation 
of output, market- or consumer-sharing (allocation of markets and consumers) and 
restrictions placed upon the licensee hindering him to exploit his own technology are 
hardcore restraints. In addition, restrictions as to what extent the parties can carry out 
research and development (R&D) is also defined as a hardcore restriction in art. 4(1), 
but only in cases where such a restriction is not indispensable to prevent licensed know-
how from being disclosed to others. 
 However, this hardcore list cannot be applied without certain exemptions. These 
will also be acknowledged and explained over the following pages, where each of the 
groups of hardcore restrictions between competitors will be examined. 
 
6.2.1 Price fixing 
 
 Price fixing between competing companies has always been regarded as one of 
the most anti-competitive measures firms can engage in under EC competition policy, 
and the practice is listed first under the prohibition rule in art. 81(1). The effect of this 
cartel-like behaviour is almost always increased prices for the consumers, and usually, 
this is also the very object of such an agreement clause. Price fixing agreements are also 
extremely unlikely to produce the wanted effects and fulfil the four criteria listed in art. 
  36 
81(3), as they inter alia almost never are indispensable to the object of "[...] allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit", since the aim usually is the opposite. 
One of the few exceptions can be found in Uniform Eurocheques56, where the 
commission fee for cashing in Eurocheques was fixed. Here, the Commission granted 
an individual exemption since it found that the agreement in this case was for the 
benefit of the consumers, who would know the common amount of money they were 
charged. The same happened in Visa International57, only this time the subject matter 
was the intercharge fee between issuing and acquiring banks in the Visa-system. A 
somewhat less logical decision was made in AuA/LH, where an agreement containing 
both price fixing and market sharing between the two airline companies Austrian 
Airlines and Lufthansa was individually exempted, mostly due to the "important 
synergistic effects" such an agreement was found to have58. The fact that the exemption 
came at a time when airliners throughout Europe were struggling to avoid bankruptcy 
did probably play in. Nevertheless, the Commission found this agreement to enhance 
the overall service level offered to the consumers.  
 The rule in art. 4(1) held together with art. 4(1)(a) of the TTBE gives a non-
application of the benefit of the block exemption to agreements which "directly or 
indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other factors under the control of the 
parties, have as their object" ... "the restriction of a party's ability to determine its prices 
when selling products to third parties". In technology transfer agreements, this can have 
the form of a direct agreement on the level of prices charged, possibly with agreed 
maximum rebates, cf. the Guidelines para. 79. Secondly, a more indirect way of fixing 
prices can be infringing art. 4 (1) (a) where the parties agree on "disincentives"59 to set a 
different price than the recommended one, for instance by raising the rate of the 
royalties if the products are sold at a rebate price. As emphasised in the Guidelines para. 
79, the mere obligation on the hands of the licensee to pay a minimum royalty is not 
caught by the prohibition. 
 Thirdly, where royalties are calculated on basis of the total number of products 
sold by the licensee, even those which do not incorporate the licensed technology, art. 
                                                 
56 OJ [1985] L 35/43 [1985] 3 CMLR 434. 
57 OJ [2002] L 318/17, [2003] 4 CMLR 283. 
58 A parallel may be found in the exemptions made for certain liner conferences by the Commission. 
59 Cf. the Guidelines para 79. 
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4(1)(a) will be infringed. In these cases, the agreement will restrict the licensee's ability 
to use his own technology, which also is caught by another hardcore prohibition, 
namely art. 4(1)(d). However, this sort of agreements can in certain cases fulfil the 
conditions laid down in art. 81(3), but only where it will prove difficult to calculate the 
amount of royalties payable by the licensee since the "licensed technology leaves no 
visible trace on the final product"60, and alternative methods to calculated the royalties 
are absent. 
 Finally, in cases where the parties calculate the royalties on the basis of 
individual sales, the royalty level impacts on the marginal cost of the products. This can 
be used as an excuse to fix prices, and is often seen in cases where the parties use cross-
licensing combined with running royalties. The case of so-called running royalties in 
licensing agreements have been a topic for debate in the time before the adoption of the 
new TTBE. As Monti points out61, such clauses usually are agreed upon in order to 
share the risk between the licensor and the licensee, as royalties are calculated on the 
basis of individual sales. However, running royalties can also be used to set up a 
disguised cartel, especially in combination with cross-licensing, which was viewed as 
hardcore in the draft Regulation - and widely critisised. The result in the final text is that 
such agreements only fall under the hardcore definition if the license agreement in 
question is proven to be a hidden cartel, while running royalties as such is not defined as 
being a hardcore restraint. The parties must therefore have a legitimate, pro-competitive 
purpose with such agreements.62 Dolmans underlines63 that it is a common practice to 
calculate on the basis of individual sales, and that this practice in no way sould be seen 
as collusive behaviour per se. 
 
6.2.2 Limitation of output 
 
 A restriction on the level of output is defined in the Guidelines to the TTBE as 
"a limitation on how much a party may produce and sell"64, and in terms of technology 
                                                 
60 Cf. the Guidelines para 81. 
61 Monti's speech, page 5. 
62 See further Monti's speech page 5 and the Guidelines para 80. 
63 See World Competition Law and Economics Review p 356. 
64 The Guidelines para 82. 
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transfer agreements, it can be a limitation on the amount of products sold both by the 
licensor and the licensee. Many of the hardcore restraints in art. 4 seem to be 
concentrated around the thought that the licensor lays down restrictions on the licensee, 
but in many cases, it will be important to keep in mind that the licensee can the strong 
party as well. The prohibition is found in art. 4(1)(b), and does not cover cases where 
the licensee gets his output of contract products limited in a non-reciprocal agreement, 
or on only one of the licensees in a reciprocal agreement. This is one prime example of 
how non-reciprocal licensing agreements are treated less hard than reciprocal ones. 
 Art. 81(1) specifically prohibits agreements with a view to "limit or control 
production, markets, technical development, or investment", at the same time as such 
agreements are unlikely to benefit from art. 81(3), since they rarely are "indispensable". 
The exception is believed to be certain specialisation agreements. It is a known fact that 
limited output can contribute to higher prices by distorting the balance between supply 
and demand, the best example is probably OPEC, the cartel consisting of a number of 
oil producing countries who collude in limiting the output each time the oil price gets 
too low. The Commission has on a number of occasions been striking down on all sorts 
of output limitations as well as more advanced quota-arrangements, often in conjunction 
with market sharing or price fixing. Most serious, of course, are situations where a 
number of companies controlling a majority of the market engage in output limitation, 
as are situations where the licensor use a standard licensing agreement where a number 
of licensees are obliged to participate in the same cartel-like behaviour. The Quinine 
Cartel65 was the first time the Commission fined firms for output limitation, and 
freezing of market shares in the form of output limitation was condemned by the 
Commission in Cartonboard66.  
 Art. 4(1)(b) only targets reciprocal output restrictions on both of the parties to an 
agreement output restrictions on the licensor. The reason why other, non-reciprocal 
agreements containing output limitation is exempted, is according to the Guidelines 
para. 83 that one-way restrictions inter alia "not necessarily lead to a lower output on 
the market". As for reciprocal agreements where only one of the licensees must agree on 
output limitation, this may be a result of the technology cross-licensed by that licensee 
simply is of higher value than the technology of the other licensees. Therefore, this is 
                                                 
65 OJ [1984] L 220/27, [1985] 2 CMLR 108. 
66 OJ [1994] L 134/1, [1994] 5 CMLR 547. 
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believed by the Commission to promote further improvements of technology as well as 
increased technology competition and R&D, since the other licensees may struggle to 
develop better technology. These considerations are mentioned in the Guidelines para. 
83. 
 
6.2.3 Allocation of markets or consumers 
 
 The allocation of markets and consumers is directly contrary to the single market 
imperative, which is one of the core purposes of the EC, as it is highly likely to hinder 
intra-brand competition and the free movement of goods and services between member 
states. The result is often, as mentioned, higher prices and in some cases a reduced 
availability in certain areas. As Whish points out67, market sharing can be more 
"effective" for the typical cartels than price fixing, since it removes the price 
competition completely, and is an easier agreement to implement. Agreements 
implementing market sharing of various degrees of severity is, both in terms of 
agreements between competitors and non-competitors, especially widespread in 
technology transfer agreements, where it is also exempted from the hardcore list in the 
TTBE in a variety of cases. However, as a main rule, market sharing is mentioned as a 
particularly anti-competitive measure, having competition distortion as its very object, 
in art. 81(1)(b). It is also considered to be a hardcore restraint in all EC block 
exemptions. 
 The Commission has identified market sharing in a number of cases, one of the 
most grave probably being Pre-insulated pipes, where the whole EU-market was 
divided, and the participants were fined 92 million euros.68 Also, a "home-market"-
practice has been struck down upon, inter alia in Cement69, where the participants had 
agreed not to export cement into other territories. Because of the important single-
market imperative, market sharing agreements are unlikely to benefit from art. 81(3), 
even though it has been found to be indispensable in a few cases.70 
                                                 
67 Whish 2003 p 477. 
68 OJ [1999] L 24/1, [1999] 4 CMLR 402, upheld in Cases T-9 etc HFB Holding v Commission [2002] 
ECR II-1487, [2001] 4 CMLR 1066. 
69 OJ [1994] L 343/1 [1995] 4 CMLR 327. 
70 See for instance Transocean Marine Paint Association, JO [1967] L 163/10, [1967] CMLR D9. 
  40 
 In art. 4(1)(c), the prohibition concerns "the allocation of markets or customers", 
while the provision entails a "white list within", containing a number of allowed types 
of agreements. The main prohibition concerns competitors in a reciprocal agreement, 
agreeing not to produce or sell in certain areas, including a ban on active and/or passive 
sales into other territories, as well as to certain customers. When the agreement is non-
reciprocal, a number of exemptions are listed in art. 4(1)(c)(i-vii).  
 
6.2.3.1 Exceptions from the hardcore list in cases similar to market sharing in 
non-reciprocal agreements 
 
 As non-reciprocal agreements are less likely to distort competition, these enjoy 
certain exceptions to the prohibition on agreements containing elements of market can 
customer sharing, cf. art. 4(1)(c)(ii), (iv-v) and (vii). The rationale behind these 
somewhat generous exceptions, allowing i.e. restrictions on both active and passive 
sales, is explained by Monti as a way to "provide sufficient protection to the licensor in 
order to encourage him to license his technology".71 These exceptions were narrower in 
the old TTBE, and the general idea seems to be that the licensor would be less likely to 
engage in technology transfer agreements if he did not get the ability to protect himself 
by these measures. Further, the licensee will probably be encouraged to enter an 
agreement if he gets an exclusive licence. 
 In (ii), exclusive licenses are exempted, both when a limitation is set on the 
technical field of use and product markets. Quite often, a licensee is granted a certain 
territory where he is protected from competition from other licensees as well as the 
licensor himself. The reason why this is allowed, is simply because the licensee should 
be given a chance access the market and invest in the technology. As the Guidelines 
para. 86 states, the object of these agreements are "not necessarily to share markets". 
 As in (ii), point (iv) block exempts non-reciprocal agreements where the licensor 
and the licensee agree not to engage in active or passive sales into the exclusive 
territory of the other party, cf. point (ii). The rationale is the same as in (ii); a shared 
interest between the licensor and the licensee to protect investments, while the risk of 
hardcore market sharing as the very object of the agreement is less likely. 
                                                 
71 See Monti's speech, page 5. 
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 In point (v), restrictions on active sales by the licensee into territories reserved 
for other licensees by the licensor, both by means of customers and markets, and where 
the latter is not a competitor of the licensor, are block exempted. The reason for this 
exception is to create an equity of arms between the licensee who is competing with the 
licensor, and the non-competing licensee who is protected in these agreements, who is 
not on the market. Here it is important to remember what a technology transfer 
agreement is all about, as agreements between licensees do not involve any transfer of 
technology and are thus not covered by the TTBE, nor are agreements between more 
than two parties. These latter mentioned agreements can amount to cartel activity, and 
are not certainly not block exempted, cf. the Guidelines para. 89. 
 Point (vii) excepts cases where the licensee is obliged to engage in "backup-
production", or an alternative source of supply for one customer only, no matter how 
many licenses concerning this customer have already been given by the licensor. The 
main reason why this way of customer-allocation is allowed, is because it is highly 
unlikely to have a grave impact on competition. 
 
6.2.3.2 Field of use and captive use restrictions 
 A field of use restriction is exempted from the prohibition in art. 4(1)(c) in art. 4 
(1)(c)(i), while captive use restrictions are exempted in art. 4(1)(c)(vi).  
 A field of use restriction limits the parties' ability to use the licensed technology 
to produce other products or implement it in other technical processes than those agreed. 
This exceptions from the hardcore main rule is valid regardless of whether the 
agreement is reciprocal or non-reciprocal, however, this was not the initial proposal of 
the Commission, as it suggested that only field of use restrictions in non-reciprocal 
agreements should be block exempted. The firms and institutions submitting comments 
on the proposal argued fiercely against this division, subsequently managing to alter 
what was to become the final TTBE. As Monti explains, the risk of hidden market 
sharing in reciprocal agreements are indeed higher, but "less prominent in case of field 
of use restrictions than with reciprocal territorial or customer restrictions, as it is less 
likely that competitors withdraw completely from a particular product market".72 For 
the block exemption to be valid, however, the Commission have laid down two 
                                                 
72 See Monti's speech, page 5. 
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conditions in para. 90 of the Guidelines; the restrictions must not concern anything else 
but the licensed technologies, and the parties must not be limited in the use of their own 
technologies, cf. the prohibition in art. 4(1)(d). 
 Captive use restrictions are defined in the Guidelines para. 92 as "a requirement 
whereby the licensee may produce the products incorporating the licensed technology 
only for his own use". These restrictions are exempted from the hardcore list in art. 4 (1) 
(c) (vi), as they can be a good way to spread the technology in question between 
competitors. Most common are clauses where the licensee agree not to sell components 
to other producers, however, an obligation on the licensee not to sell spare parts for his 
own products, will not be exempted, cf. (vi) and para. 92 of the Guidelines. 
 
6.2.3.3 Sole licenses 
 
 In art. 4 (1)(c)(iii), sole license agreements are not defined as hardcore restraints. 
As mentioned73, a sole license gives the licensee a somewhat limited exclusivity in the 
way that no other licences will be given in the same territory, contrary to more hardcore 
exclusivity licences, which will give near total exclusivity. A sole license does in 
addition often not exclude the licensor from the market in question. Here, the rationale 
behind the exception is that sole licences are of such a limited competition distorting 
nature that they are exempted even in reciprocal agreements. In addition, and as 
explained in the Guidelines para. 88, such agreements do not hinder the parties in using 
their own technology in the other territories. 
 
6.2.4 Restriction of the use of a party's own competing technology 
 
 This particular hardcore restraint is more serious that it may appear at first 
glance, as it has the potential to restrict both intra- and inter-brand and -technology 
competition, in addition to in effect keeping the licensee away from improving his own 
technology. In art. 4(1)(d) first alternative, such restraints are defined as hardcore. 
According to the Guidelines para. 95, the main issue with restrictions on the licensee's 
                                                 
73 See the Nungesser-case in chapter 4. 
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ability to use his own technology, is the fact that such a clause make his technology less 
competitive than the licensed technology. The hardcore restriction also covers both 
agreements where the licensee is obliged to pay royalties on products incorporating his 
own technology, as well as a ban on the licensee on licensing out his technology. 
 
6.2.5 R&D-restrictions 
 
 Restrictions in the parties' abilities to engage in or carry out research and 
development (R&D) can have a slight chance of restricting competition, but first of all, 
it can delay improvements and innovation in the field of the licensed technology. 
Therefore, art. 4(1)(d) second alternative defines as a main rule such restrictions as 
hardcore, while the Guidelines uses basically the same arguments as mentioned in 6.2.4. 
Such restrictions imposed on the licensee in terms of possible R&D-agreements 
concerning his own technology is also covered. 
 However, if such a restriction is indispensable to prevent third parties from 
getting to know the secret know-how inherit in a technology transfer agreement, it shall 
be exempted from the hardcore rule. Indeed, one of the main characteristics of know-
how is that it is secret. Such a disclosure would then ruin parts of the licensed subject-
matter, creating a loss for the licensor. 
 
 
6.3 Agreements between non-competitors 
 
 TT-agreements between non-competitors are block exempted when neither of 
the parties have a market share exceeding 30% of the relevant product and technology 
market, cf. art. 3(2). Here, slightly different considerations form the basis for the 
hardcore restraints banned in art. 4(2). While anti-competitive agreements between 
competitors can have a direct impact on the intra-technology competition, agreements 
between non-competitors can have an equally grave impact on the inter-technology 
competition. In some cases, blocking positions, either one-way or two-way, exists, 
meaning that the licensed technology cannot be used without infringing a second 
technology. In these cases, the parties are considered to be non-competitors, which they 
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in general view as positive, due to both the market share cap and the somewhat different 
hardcore list. The legal problem here is the Commission's emphasis on "objective" 
factors to prove such a blocking position, cf. para. 32 of the Guidelines. This may prove 
to be costly for the firms involved, since their own in-house assessment would hardly be 
deemed objective. 
 
6.3.1 Price fixing 
 In art. 4(2)(a), restricting a party's ability to determine its prices when selling to 
third parties is defined as a hardcore restraint. The practice targeted here is usually 
different ways of achieving minimum pricing, and not suggested maximum prices or 
recommended prices, since the latter would less likely make the products in question 
more expensive. Also included are more indirect ways of fixing the retail price, as listed 
in the Guidelines para. 97, and which can be anything from setting up a price 
monitoring system in order to identify cases where the other party is cutting prices, to 
more grave behaviour as outright threats and intimidations from one party, forcing the 
other party to raise prices. Most common, however, are agreements implementing a 
whole spectrum of different financial incentives to make the licensee coordinate selling 
prices with either the licensor or with other licensees. As mentioned in the Guidelines 
para. 97, quantity-rebates in the form of most-favoured-customer(s) may be one of the 
most common. 
 As mentioned under agreements between competitors; price fixing is a serious 
threat to competition, and will in most cases lead to higher prices for the consumers. 
Being a hardcore restraint, it must satisfy the conditions of art. 81(3) EC in order to be 
legal outside the safe harbour of the TTBE. This is usually not an easy task for such 
restrictions, as it rarely transfer any part of the gain to the customers. 
 
 
6.3.2 Restrictions of the licensee's active and passive sales 
 Agreements forcing the licensee to restrict his passive sales of products 
incorporating the licensed technology are defined as hardcore by art. 4(2)(b), and is in 
many ways the equivalent to market sharing under art. 4(1)(c). Judging from both the 
prohibition itself and the Guidelines, both direct and indirect measures are targeted. One 
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way of actively restricting passive sales may be obligations to not sell to certain 
customers, or customers in specific territories, as well as being forced to refer orders 
from customers outside the licensee's territory to the respective other licensees. A wide 
range of indirect ways of achieving the same goal are mentioned in the Guidelines para. 
98, i.e. a verification system set up to monitor which of the licensees are selling the 
goods at a price regarded as too low. 
 However, there are a number of exemptions from the hardcore main rule. 
Restricting the licensor's passive sales are not viewed as hardcore restraints, according 
to the Guidelines para. 99. The same is true for restrictions on active sales by the 
licensee, except in cases of selective distribution in art. 4 (2)(b)(vi), see 6.3.3. of this 
paper. As defined in the Guidelines to vertical restraints para. 50, active sales occur 
when a firm is "actively approaching individual customers inside another distributor's 
exclusive territory or exclusive customer group by for instance direct mail or visits". 
 Secondly, restrictions on the licensee's active or passive sales into the exclusive 
territory or customer group of the licensor is not on the hardcore list, cf. art. 4(2)(b)(i) 
and the Guidelines para. 100, as such restrictions are found to be pro-competitive. 
 Thirdly, a licensee will often have to make major investments when entering the 
market, and a major part of the investment is non-recoverable if he have to exit ("sunk" 
investments). To protect him in this critical phase, art. 4(2)(b)(ii) excepts restrictions on 
passive sales by other licensees into this licensee's exclusive territory or customer group 
for a period of two years from the hardcore list.  
 Further, art. 4(2)(b)(iii) block exempts agreements where the licensee can only 
use the licensed technology for captive use, i.e. for incorporation of the contract product 
into his own products, and not sell it to other competitors or producers. However, a ban 
on active or passive sales of spare parts to his own products is not exempted. 
 Art. 4(2)(b)(iv) concerns agreements where the licensee agrees to produce either 
only for one customer, or as an alternative source of supply. Such agreements are not 
hardcore, and when made between non-competitors, often not under art. 81(1) at all. 
 Likewise, when the licensee is a wholesaler, a contractual ban on him operating 
as a retailer and providing end-users with products, will often not be caught by art. 
81(1), and is thus not part of the hardcore list, cf. art. 4(2)(b)(v) and para. 104 of the 
Guidelines. 
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6.3.3 Exceptions for selective distribution systems 
 
 The last exception from the hardcore list is found in art. 4(2)(b)(vi), and exempts 
agreements where the licensee is obliged to refuse sales to distributors who are 
unauthorised by the licensor. This way, the licensee becomes part of a selective 
distribution system. Such a system is allowed under EC competition law, since certain 
types of products cannot be sold anywhere, for a variety of reasons. In the landmark 
verdict of Metro 174, a retailer was denied to sell electronics from SABA in his self-
service stores, which sparked off an art. 81-case. The ECJ clearly stated that selective 
distribution systems based on purely qualitative criteria are not caught by art. 81(1). 
Later dubbed 'the Metro-test', the product must be of a type that makes selective 
distribution necessary. In general terms, this includes product which are technically 
complicated, brand images and short-lived products as newspapers. Further, the 
qualitative criteria must be pure, and applied in a non-discriminatory way. Finally, any 
restrictions must not go further than necessary to obtain the aim of protecting the quality 
of the product. 
 However, in cases where no transfer of technology are involved, the TTBE 
cannot be applied, but the block exemption on vertical agreements. Even so, both the 
production level, the wholesale level and the retail level, or all three, can be affected by 
a licensing agreement, and thus be under the TTBE.75 
7 Conclusion 
 
 As we have seen in this paper, the new TTBE have two overall aims. Firstly, it 
shall secure legal certainty for firms engaging in technology transfer in a new 
environment without any chance of getting an advance clearance. If the agreement falls 
under the safe harbour of the TTBE, neither the Commission nor national competition 
authorities will take action unless major changes are made to the agreement after 
implementation. By removing the old "grey" areas in the former block exemption, more 
                                                 
74 Case 26/16 [1977] ECR 1875, [1978] 2 CMLR 44. 
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clarity has been sought while drafting the rules, at the same time as those falling outside 
the block exemption will still have a chance to assess their agreements based on art. 81 
(3) EC. 
 Secondly, the new rules shall encourage licensing of IPRs by further broadening 
the scope of both the subject matter in a TT-agreement and the number of accepted 
agreement clauses which does not have as their object the distortion or of competition. 
By widespread licensing, competition both inter- and intra-brand, as well as inter- and 
intra-technology, will have a chance to grow, with lower prices for the consumers and a 
free movement of goods and services throughout the Community as a wanted result.  
  In order to reach these goals, the TTBE contains mainly two cumulative factors 
which have to be satisfied; a market share cap on the firms party to the agreement and 
banned hardcore restraints, concerning the very nature of the clauses inherit in the 
agreement. Also, the new Regulation distinguishes between agreements between 
competitors and non-competitors, as well as between reciprocal and non-reciprocal 
agreements, creating a more complex field of legislating, but at the same time creating a 
detailed map where it will be fairly easy to place an agreement. 
 We have seen that submissions made by companies and institutions on the 
proposed new rules have been taken into consideration by the Commission, and 
amended in several cases, especially is this true in terms of the new hardcore-list. 
 As for the criticism, some have argued that the new rules actually create less 
legal certainty for the companies. Especially "market leaders", who have no chance of 
getting below the market share thresholds in agreements with competing firms, have 
protested. Also, some have argued that the focus on market shares are anti-innovative, 
since the assessment process is "backward-looking"76; focusing on yesterday's market 
share rather than tomorrow's. This is particulary true in cases of completely new 
products and markets, the so-called innovation markets. 
 However, it seems to be the absence of hardcore restraints in technology transfer 
agreements that is the focal point of the Commission, stating several times both in the 
TTBE itself, its recitals and in the Guidelines that there is no presumption of illegality 
outside the market share thresholds. The new TTBE certainly benefits firms of slightly 
smaller sizes, allowing them to easily navigate themselves inside the safe harbour, 
                                                                                                                                               
75 Cf. the Guidelines para. 39. 
76 See for instance World Competition Law and Economics Review, vol. 27, No.3 p 361. 
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without forcing them to wait for advance clearance as before. It can also be argued that 
firms of scale have the legal capability and economic stamina to examine their 
agreements more closely under art. 81(3).  
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